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Abstract
In a famous series of experiments, Libet investigated the subjective timing of awareness of an intention to move, a task that
can be considered a metacognitive judgement. The ability to strategically produce inaccurate metacognitions about inten-
tions has been postulated to be central to the changes in judgements of agency common to all hypnotic responding.
Therefore, differences in hypnotisability may be reflected in Libet’s measure. Specifically, the ability to sustain inaccurate
judgements of agency displayed by highly hypnotisable people may result from their having coarser higher order represen-
tations of intentions. They, therefore, should report a delayed time of intention relative to less hypnotisable individuals.
Conversely, mindfulness practice aims at accurate metacognition, including of intentions, and may lead to the development
of finer grained higher order representations of intending. Thus, the long-term practice of mindfulness may produce an ear-
lier judgement of the time of an intention. We tested these groups using Libet’s task, and found that, consistent with predic-
tions, highly hypnotisable people reported a later time of intention than less hypnotisable people and meditators an earlier
time than non-meditators. In a further two studies, we replicated the finding that hypnotisable people report later aware-
ness of a motor intention and additionally found a negative relationship between trait mindfulness and this measure.
Based on these findings, we argue that hypnotic response and meditation involve opposite processes.
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Introduction
Voluntary actions can be distinguished from involuntary or re-
flex actions in that they can, on reflection, be accompanied by
awareness of intending to act, as investigated in the famous ex-
periments of Libet and colleagues (Libet et al., 1983). In these
studies, participants reported the time at which they experi-
enced an “urge” to move (W) while watching an oscilloscope
“clock.” As such, Libet’s W timing can be interpreted as a meas-
ure of temporal metacognition and as a chronometric measure
of the sense of agency (Wolpe and Rowe, 2014). We use it to in-
vestigate the nature of both hypnotic responding and mindful-
ness, which both have, we argue, essential metacognitive
components. We will argue for the relationship between W and
both hypnotic responding and mindfulness via higher order
thought theory.
Higher order thoughts target first order intentions
Higher order theories of consciousness relate metacognition to
conscious experience by arguing that a mental state becomes
conscious by virtue of a second-order process that is about it
(Lau and Rosenthal, 2011). For example, a visual percept (e.g., “a
red ball,” the first-order state because it is about the world) be-
comes conscious by one becoming aware of it with a higher
order state (e.g., one with the content, “I see a red ball,” higher
order because it is about a mental state). Therefore, Libet’s W
judgements can be interpreted as depending on higher order
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states targeting first-order intentions. Changes in higher order
processing (i.e., involving states about mental states) may be ex-
pected to result in changes to the content of consciousness.
Conversely, if normal events elicit unusual experiences, it may
be hypothesised that higher order states are being employed in
unusual ways.
Hypnotic responding is due to changes in
self-monitoring
Differences in the ability to experience hypnotic effects are con-
siderable, and they can be measured using standardised scales
based on the number of hypnotic suggestions to which an indi-
vidual responds (Laurence et al., 2008; Woody and Barnier, 2008).
As will be explained, it is possible to describe the unusual ex-
periences of hypnosis as resulting from changes in higher order
states. The classical hypnotic suggestion effect is characterised
by the experience of involuntariness, with control instead
attributed to the hypnotist or to some feature of the hypnotic
suggestion (Weitzenhoffer, 1980). Alterations of the sense of
agency are, therefore, central to hypnotic responding (Polito
et al., 2013), and this may provide a clue as to where to look for
finding reliable predictors of hypnotisability.
A broad distinction can be made between theories of hypno-
sis that propose that hypnotic responding is intentional and
those that do not. For example, according to dissociated control
theory (Woody and Bowers, 1994), hypnosis causes a dissoci-
ation between action generation and executive control systems.
In this case, metacognitive judgements of agency during hyp-
notic responding are accurate, as subjects genuinely have no
executive control over the action, and judge that they do not. A
second theoretical approach argues that hypnotic responding is
intentional (or under executive control), and is due to changes
in self-monitoring (e.g, Spanos, 1986; Kihlstrom, 1992). The com-
mon denominator of the latter group of theories has been
dubbed “cold control” (Dienes, 2012). The word “cold” is used,
because the theory supposes that intentional actions are carried
out in the absence of an appropriate higher order thought
(HOT).
Cold control theory draws on Rosenthals’s HOT theory
(Rosenthal, 2005) and proposes that the changes in the
conscious experience of intending that define a hypnotic ex-
perience are the result of inaccurate HOTs about not having a
first-order intention. Therefore, hypnotic responding is made
possible by an ability to relinquish metacognition related to vol-
untary behavior in response to a hypnotic situation (Dienes,
2012). So, on this account, an ideomotor suggestion to raise an
arm results in a normal first-order intention to raise the arm (cf.
Schlegel et al., 2015). However, the intention fails to become con-
scious because there is no accurate HOT that might ordinarily
be directed at the first-order intention if a voluntary movement
were being attended to (“I am intending to move my arm”).
There is in fact a directly contrary HOT, appropriate to the hyp-
notic situation, but inappropriate to the facts (“I am not intend-
ing to move my arm,” which constitutes a HOT broadly
construed as a state about the nature, including non-existence,
of first-order states; contrast Rosenthal, 2005). So, hypnotic re-
sponding requires an inaccurate HOT related to an intention,
not merely the absence of an accurate HOT. If highly hypnotis-
able people are better able to form inaccurate HOTs of intend-
ing, this ability may be supported by their having a generally
weaker coupling of HOTs to first-order intentions (Semmens-
Wheeler and Dienes, 2012). Such a weaker coupling may be re-
flected by later awareness of an intention to move.
Awarenesss of intentions in mindfulness meditation
Mindfulness can be defined as the cultivation of equanimous
awareness of present experience as present experience, while
sustaining that experience or letting it go according to task pur-
poses (e.g., Williams and Kabat-Zinn, 2013). For example, if the
aim is to attend to the breath, when experiences unrelated to
the breath arise, they are judged as task unrelated and allowed
to pass; but experiences of the sensation of the breath on the lip
are judged as appropriate and sustained. These judgments are
made without feelings of disappointment or triumph.
Mindfulness meditation is thus intrinsically an exercise in the
(metacognitive) control and monitoring of mental processes
(Bishopet al., 2004; Gethin, 2015; Jankowski and Holas, 2014;
Teasdale, 1999). But apart from a recent report that mindfulness
meditation enhances metacognitive abilities (Baird et al., 2014),
and evidence that mindfulness is associated with a more fine-
grained awareness of emotions (e.g., Hill and Updegraff, 2010),
there has been surprisingly little work relating meditation prac-
tice to metacognitive measures. Awareness of intentions consti-
tutes part of the four foundations of mindfulness (Analayo,
2003). The four foundations are: First, awareness of the body in
terms of its parts, postures, and movements; second, awareness
of feelings, specifically as pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent;
third, awareness of mental states broadly in terms of whether
they are conducive to flourishing or not (“deluded,”
“concentrated,” etc.); and, fourth, awareness of mental states
classified in a number of detailed ways to bring out their nature
and relation to flourishing (Analayo, 2003). The final category
includes intentions. (The progression is from the more concrete
given content of a mental state to more abstract mental state
properties claimed as relevant to flourishing by Buddhist the-
ory.) Buddhist scholars have also argued that the practice of
mindfulness should lead to an enhanced awareness of action
intentions (Dreyfus, 2013). Therefore, mindfulness meditators
might be expected to have an earlier awareness of an intention
to move (cf. Jo et al., 2015, who report that meditators have
greater access to the negative deflections of the slow cortical
potentials averaged to produce the early readiness potential
which is associated with conscious intentions to act).
Mindfulness and hypnotic response are in tension
In summary, we have argued that highly hypnotisable people
on the one hand, and meditators on the other, lie at two ends of
a spectrum of metacognition or accurate HOTs related to inten-
tion (see Lifshitz et al., 2014, and Raz and Lifshitz, 2016, for a dis-
cussion of different theoretical perspectives on the relation
between meditation and hypnosis). In support of this assertion,
it has been found that meditators score lower on hypnotisability
scales than non-meditators and that highly hypnotisable people
score lower on trait mindfulness scales than low hypnotisables
(Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes, 2012).
We used a variation of Libet’s experimental method to time
the conscious awareness of an intentional action in high, me-
dium, and low hypnotisable subjects, and in mindfulness medi-
tators. Since cold control theory proposes that hypnotic
responding relies on an ability to generate inaccurate HOTs of
intending, it was predicted that the highly hypnotisable group
would report an awareness of their intention as occurring later
than other groups. On the basis that mindfulness meditation
may lead to a tighter metacognitive coupling between first order
intentions and their related HOTs, we predicted that mindful-
ness meditators would report an earlier W time than non-
meditators.
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Study 1
Method
Participants
Twelve long-term meditators with at least 3 years of meditation
practice were recruited from Buddhist organisations in
Brighton. One meditator was excluded as they reported an in-
ability to read clocks. So, data from 11 meditators were analyzed
(5 males, 6 females; mean age¼ 37.8, SD¼ 16.4) with a mean of
12.7 years of meditation experience (SD¼ 10.6) and a mean of
14.7 h per month meditation (SD¼ 11.3). Meditators were asked
to provide details of their practice in simple terms and all re-
ported using a form of mindfulness meditation.
Fifty-four undergraduate participants of varying hypnotis-
ability were recruited from the University of Sussex hypnosis
screening database. Eight reported prior experience of medita-
tion and were excluded, so data from 7 highly hypnotisable
(1 male, 6 females; mean age¼ 19.6, SD¼ 2.1), 19 low hypnotis-
able (19 females; mean age¼ 20.3, SD¼ 6.9), and 20 medium
hypnotisable subjects (3 males, 17 females; mean age¼ 23.0,
SD¼ 6.0) are reported. Using a standard test of hypnotisability
(Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility,
Form C (WSGC; Bowers, 1993) participants categorised as highly
hypnotisable scored 9 or above from a possible 12 (M¼ 9.29,
SD¼ 0.50). Medium hypnotisable participants scored between 4
and 8 (M¼ 6.00, SD¼ 1.41) and low hypnotisable subjects scored
3 or below (M¼ 1.95, SD¼ 1.22).
Participants were recruited for the duration of one term,
until there were no more responses. Bayesian analyses were
used to assess sensitivity. As stopping was not conditional on a
function of the P-value, orthodox statistics assuming fixed N
could be used (Cox and Mayo, 2010, section 10.1). Crucially, we
used Bayesian analyses to indicate the strength of evidence
for H1 versus H0; the measure of evidence is valid no matter
what the stopping rule.
Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex
ethics committee and informed consent was obtained from
each participant before commencing with the study.
Participants received cash payment of £5 or course credits.
Apparatus and materials
The apparatus, controlled by a Programmable Interface
Controller (PIC) microcontroller, comprised two connected units:
a clock (Fig. 1) and a switch assembly. The clock had a
conventional face, but the hour labels (1, 2, 3. . . 12) were replaced
with minute labels (5, 10, 15. . . 60). The clock’s single hand was
driven by a stepper motor, requiring 2400 steps to complete one
revolution. The motor was pulsed every millisecond, thus one
revolution took 2.40 s and the “minute” marks on the face repre-
sented increments of 40 ms. When participants reported values
on the clock face, these were converted to the equivalent num-
ber of milliseconds from the 12 o’clock (60) mark. The clock was
connected to a switch, the contacts being closed by a light metal
sleeve, worn on the participant’s finger. The sleeve was lined
with soft foam, the arrangement being designed so that no tact-
ile information was available to indicate whether the switch was
closed or not; this could be deduced only via proprioceptive feed-
back. In the rest position, the finger, with its conducting sleeve,
rested across the two contacts of the switch, completing the cir-
cuit. Raising the finger broke the circuit, and the time registered
by the clock at that moment was recorded by the microcontroller
with 1 ms resolution. The result was shown on a seven-segment
display, oriented out of sight of the participant. The finger could
be lifted voluntarily, but there was also a mechanism by which
the experimenter could cause the finger to rise. This facility was
not used in the experiments reported here.
All participants were asked to complete the dissociative ex-
periences scale II (DES-II, Carlson and Putnam, 1993). One medi-
tator did not complete the DES-II.
Procedure
The experiment was adapted from Libet et al. (1983). Subjects
carried out 5 practice trials and 40 test trials (2 blocks of 20 trials
with a 5-min rest period). Participants were asked to rest their
finger upon the switch assembly to complete the circuit, then to
wait for one full revolution of the clock hand before lifting their
finger at a time of their choosing. They were asked not to plan
ahead or to aim for a particular time. After raising their finger,
they were asked to replace their finger and then to report the
time indicated by the clock at which they had first experienced
their immediate intention to move (a W judgement). They were
instructed to make full use of the clock face in reporting (rather
than rounding the time on the clock to the nearest five unit
marker). The time at which the circuit was broken was recorded,
together with the stated clock time.
Analysis
Finger-lift times (in milliseconds) were subtracted from the sub-
jective report of the timing of immediate intention (converted
to milliseconds) to give a numerical value for the difference be-
tween the timing of the reported intention and the moment at
which the circuit was broken (W). Time differences on individ-
ual trials with values greater than 3 SD from the mean were
excluded for each participant (21 trials in total, 0.9% of all trials).
Mean scores for time difference were taken for each group and,
following convention, a negative number was used to denote
that the awareness of intention occurred before the circuit was
broken and a positive number that it occurred afterward.
The interquartile range of judgement errors was compared
between groups to assess whether there were differences in at-
tention to the task. Mean DES-II scores were calculated for
group comparison and correlation analysis.
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence (cf.
Wagenmakers et al., in press). A B of above 3 indicates substan-
tial evidence for the alternative hypothesis and below 1/3 sub-
stantial evidence for the null. B’s between 3 and 1/3 indicates
data insensitivity (see Jeffreys, 1939; Dienes, 2014). In order to
indicate how strongly evidence supports a hypothesis, one hasFigure 1. The clock apparatus.
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to specify what the hypothesis predicts; that is, for H1, one
needs to specify roughly the sort of effect predicted, as for ex-
ample based on a relevant past study. Williams et al. (2011)
found a difference of 230 ms in W timing between functional
motor disorder patients and a control group. It has been pro-
posed that such functional disorders rely on the same mechan-
isms as hypnotic response (Bell et al., 2011), so the effect is
relevant. Assuming 230 ms is a rough maximum effect we could
expect given it was found comparing a clinical population to
controls, Bayes factors for W timing group differences were cal-
culated using a half-normal distribution with SD¼ 115 ms.
Although here we interpret the results with respect to Bayes
Factors, P values are also provided for each analysis.
Bayes factors for correlations of hypnotisability with other
measures were calculated using a half-normal distribution with
SD¼ 0.30 based on the moderate correlations reported between
hypnotisability scores and other cognitive or questionnaire-
based measures (e.g., Laurence et al., 2008). As directional pre-
dictions were not made for correlations between hypnotisability
and gender or age, the Bayes factors for these correlations were
calculated using a full-normal. Here, BH(0, x) refers to a Bayes fac-
tor where H1 is specified as a half-normal distribution with a SD
of x (for directional predictions), and BN(0, x) indicates H1 was
specified as a normal distribution with mean 0 and SD x (for
non-directional predictions). Bayes factors and t-tests were cor-
rected for unequal variance by the procedure of Box and Tiao
(1972, p. 107) for adjusting standard errors and degrees of
freedom.
The 3-df effect of group was decomposed into three con-
trasts. Specifically, the effect of hypnotisability was evaluated
in terms of a linear trend (highs versus lows) and a quadratic
trend (mediums versus the average of highs and lows). Finally,
meditators were contrasted with mediums because the relative
numbers of participants in each hypnotisable group do not re-
flect their proportions in the population (approximately 10% of
the population are high and 10% low hypnotisable by conven-
tional thresholds). The B’s for these three contrasts were multi-
plied together to obtain an “omnibus B” evaluating the
predictions of cold control versus H0. Support for cold control
was taken as being shown by evidence: for a linear trend of hyp-
notisability versus H0; for H0 versus a quadratic trend; and for a
difference between meditators and mediums versus H0. The re-
sulting omnibus B assumes that the B for each contrast tests
predictions independently of the other contrasts in the precise
sense that the effect size tested in each contrast would not be
relevant to updating the predicted effect size for the other con-
trasts (Jeffreys, 1939, pp. 269–70). We include omnibus B only for
completeness so that wherever we give a P-value we also give a
B, but in fact no conclusions will depend on omnibus B’s in any
case.
Bayes factors for DES-II analysis were calculated with a full
normal based on half the difference between highs and lows (24
points) reported in Terhune et al. (2011).
H1 for interquartile range analysis was specified using a uni-
form from zero to the medium hypnotisable groups’ interquar-
tile range, specified as BU[0,m], where m is the maximum of the
uniform distribution. The interquartile range can be normalised
with a log transform, which also provides a “data translated”
likelihood especially suitable for Bayesian analyses when a uni-
form is used to specify predictions (Box and Tiao, 1972).
A Bayes factor for age difference between meditators and
mediums was calculated using a half-normal based on the min-
imum number of years of meditation experience (3 years) used
as a criterion for selection.
Results
We will first consider the key predictions regarding the timing
of awareness of intentions. Then we consider two more second-
ary issues: any role of dissociative experiences as measured by
DES-II; and finally any differences in sustaining attention on
the task, as measured by the consistency of the W response.
Figure 2 shows mean time differences and confidence inter-
vals for the four groups. A Welch one-way ANOVA on the time
differences (W timings) between the four groups indicated that
the groups differed, F(3, 24.63)¼ 16.54, P< 0.001, omnibus
BH(0, 115)¼ 2570.41. There was a linear trend of hypnotisability on
W judgements, t(22.76)¼ 3.84, P¼ 0.003, d¼ 1.22, BN(0, 115)¼ 92.01.
There was no quadratic trend, t(44)¼ 0.042, P¼ 0.966, d¼ 0.013,
BN(0, 115)¼ 0.23. Finally, meditators reported earlier W judge-
ments than mediums, t(28.78)¼ 3.04, P¼ 0.007, d¼ 0.95, BN(0,
115)¼ 22.27. Pearson’s coefficient was used to test for correl-
ations. A correlation between WSGC (hypnotisability) score and
W was found, r(47)¼ 0.30, P¼ 0.043, BH(0, 0.30)¼ 5.43.
There was evidence that the mean age of meditators (M¼ 37.8,
SD¼ 16.4) differed from medium hypnotisables (M¼ 23.0, SD¼ 6.9,
t(12.0)¼ 2.87, P¼ 0.014, BH(0, 3)¼ 2.98. The evidence was not sensi-
tive as to whether or not there was a within-group correlation be-
tween age and W judgements, (Fisher z-transformed)
r(57)¼0.069 (SE¼ 0.13) BN(0, 0.30)¼ 0.45. But crucially, a one-way
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) showed that, after accounting
for age, mean W differed between meditators (M¼149.1 ms,
SE¼ 29.3) and medium hypnotisable non-meditators (M¼68.5,
SE¼ 20.6), F(1,28)¼ 4.36, P¼ .046, BH(0, 115)¼ 4.40.
Turning now to dissociative experiences, the evidence was
insensitive as to whether or not there was a correlation between
W and DES-II score, r(56)¼ 0.015, P¼ 0.911, BH(0, 0.30)¼ 0.44. DES-II
and WSGC scores correlated, r(49)¼ 0.473, P¼ 0.001, BH(0,
0.30)¼ 79.45. A contrast between highs (M¼ 31.22, SD¼ 15.59) and
lows (M¼ 14.3, SD¼ 7.7) revealed a linear trend of hypnotisabil-
ity on DES-II scores, t(7.09)¼ 2.75, P¼ 0.028, d¼ 0.57, BH(0,
12)¼ 3.95, and there was no evidence one way or the other for a
quadratic trend, t(44)¼ 0.497, P¼ 0.621, BN(0, 12)¼ .47. Meditators
(M¼ 11.5, SD¼ 9.8) differed from mediums (M¼ 20.8, SD¼ 3.1),
t(23.4)¼ 2.18, P¼ 0.040, d¼ 0.88, BH(0, 12)¼ 4.70.
Finally, we consider group differences in sustaining attention
to the task, as measured by consistency of response; specifically,
a participant’s interquartile range in their W responses. There
was no linear trend of hypnotisability on inter-quartile range
(highs M¼ 143.2 ms, SD¼ 52.2; vs. lows, M¼ 131.9 ms, SD¼ 46.7)
revealed by a t-test conducted on log-transformed values,
t(24)¼ 0.627, P> 0.250, d¼ 0.29, BU[0, 2.17)¼ 0.07. Meditators
(M¼ 123.0 ms, SD¼ 40.22) and mediums (M¼ 168.2 ms, SD¼ 104.6)
did not differ in interquartile range. t(29)¼ 1.48, P¼ .149, d¼ 0.56,
BU[0, 2.17)¼ 0.23.
Study 1 discussion
The key findings of Study 1 are that highs show an especially
late awareness of intentions, consistent with cold control the-
ory. Conversely, meditators show an especially early awareness
of intentions, consistent with meditation experience inducing
metacognitive changes. We found that these differences did not
arise from attentional differences between groups, and there-
fore they may be purely metacognitive.
Dissociation has been found to interact with hypnotisability
in executive related tasks (e.g., Terhune et al., 2011). Thus, our
conclusions about the relation between high hypnotisability
and W judgments may apply only to the subgroup of highs
identified by Terhune et al. as high-dissociating highs. While
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the high DES-II scores of highs in Study 1 prevented investiga-
tion of this possibility, further research could usefully select low
dissociating highs and lows and determine if the pattern still
holds. The association we found between DES and hypnotisabil-
ity contradicts the null finding by Dienes et al. (2009); however,
the latter study tested hypnotisability and the DES in entirely
unrelated contexts, conditions known to reduce correlations of
variables with hypnotisability (Kirsch and Council, 1992). When
hypnotisability and DES are tested in the same context, people
may interpret the questions of the DES as asking about hypnotic
experiences. A possible weakness of the study is that we do not
know the hypnotisability of participants in the meditation
group. Studies 2 and 3 will assess mindfulness in participant
groups in which hypnotisability is known.
Study 2
Introduction
Study 2 was a conceptual replication of Study 1 measuring
mindfulness with a standard questionnaire in undergraduates
rather than by contrasting meditators with non-meditators and
investigated whether the early W judgements reported by
mindfulness meditators also occur in meditation naı¨ve partici-
pants high in trait mindfulness. As hypnotisability was meas-
ured on all participants, this study examined the relationship
between mindfulness and the timing of an intention to move in
groups of known hypnotisability. The study also investigated
the relationship between hypnotisability and trait mindfulness.
Buddhist traditions suggest that long-term meditation leads to
the development of mindfulness skills in everyday life, and
experienced meditators have been shown to score higher on the
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) than non-
meditators (Baer et al., 2008). Therefore, we might not expect
meditation-naive participants high in trait mindfulness to dis-
play mindfulness related metacognitive abilities to quite the
same degree as experienced meditators.
Method
Participants
Thirty-six meditation-naı¨ve undergraduate students were re-
cruited from the University of Sussex. Following initial examin-
ation of the data, two participants were excluded from further
analysis as their scores for mean W judgement identified them
as outliers by SPSS boxplot. Data from 34 participants were
therefore analyzed.
Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex
ethical committee and informed consent was obtained from
each participant before commencing with the study. Parti
cipants were compensated with course credits.
Materials and methods
Participants were screened for hypnotisability using an edited
version of the WSGC. This involved a shortened induction and
the delivery of one of two selections of five suggestions taken
from the WSGC scale. Each set of suggestions contained one
motor direct suggestion, two perceptual direct suggestions, one
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Figure 2. Mean time differences between the retrospectively self-reported time at which a volitional immediate intention to perform a motor ac-
tion was experienced and the moment at which the movement occurred. Error bars show 95% CIs (the CIs can be treated as credibility intervals
with uniform priors).
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motor challenge suggestion, and one perceptual–cognitive chal-
lenge suggestion. Participants were randomly assigned to either
set of suggestions. Unlike in the WSGC:C, in which participants
are screened as a group and, therefore, report their own object-
ive ratings, because the screening sessions were individual, it
was possible for objective ratings to be taken by the experi-
menter. The WSGC:C does not include subjective ratings and
here a further subjective rating was recorded from the partici-
pant’s verbal answers to a set of standard questions (see
Supplemental Material for the hypnosis scripts and scoring pro-
cedure). W timing was measured using the same apparatus and
procedures as in Study 1.
Participants also completed a short form of the FFMQ, a
24-item questionnaire which measures 5 different facets of
mindfulness; observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-
judging, and non-reactivity (FFMQ-SF; Bohlmeijer et al., 2011).
Participants were recruited for the duration of one term,
until there were no more responses. Bayesian analyses were
used to assess sensitivity.
Analysis
Mean judgement errors on the Libet clock task were calculated
for each participant as in Study 1. Mean ratings of objective and
subjective scores for hypnotisability and scores on the FFMQ-SF
were calculated. A combined hypnotisability measure was calcu-
lated from the objective and subjective hypnotisability ratings.
Both the objective and subjective ratings were measured on a
scale of 0–5; the combined measure was the simple average of
the subjective and objective measures. Results for the individual
hypnotisability ratings are presented in the Supplementary
Materials.
Bayes factors were calculated as in Study 1. A B was calcu-
lated for the correlation between objective and subjective hyp-
nosis scores using a full-normal with SD¼ 0.82 (converted to
Fisher’s Z) based on the average correlation between objective
and subjective hypnotisability ratings across three screening
procedures reported by Barnes et al. (2009).
Results
Subjective (M¼ 2.0, SD¼ 0.8) and objective (M¼ 2.0, SD¼ 1.4) hyp-
nosis ratings correlated, r(34)¼ 0.69, P< 0.001, BH(0, 0.82)¼ 16439.52,
The combined measure of subjective and objective hypnotisability
(M¼ 2.1, SD¼ 1.0) correlated with W judgement, (M¼75.0 ms,
SD¼ 84.5 ms), r(34)¼ 0.321, P¼ 0.065, BH(0, 0.30)¼ 3.76, and nega-
tively correlated with FFMQ-SF score, r(34)¼0.403, P¼ 0.018, BH(0,
0.30)¼ 9.39.
Study 2 discussion
These results support the relationship between hypnotisability
and judgement of intention reported in Study 1 and are consist-
ent with evidence that hypnotisability is inversely related to
trait mindfulness. However, as there was no sensitive evidence
for a correlation between trait mindfulness and W judgements,
no conclusion can be drawn as to whether trait mindfulness is
related to metacognition of motor intentions.
Study 3
Introduction
Study 3 replicated Study 2 but differed in two aspects. First, a
computer clock was used. Second, unlike in the first two stud-
ies, M judgements (the timing of action) were taken alongside
W judgements. Libet considered the M judgement an important
part of participant training, and found that when M trials were
performed before W trials, W times were significantly more
negative (Libet, 1983). However, the use of M judgements to in-
fluence identification of the moment of intention has been
criticised (Gomes, 1998), and Pockett and Miller (2007) argue that
subjects in subjective timing experiments should be kept as
naive as possible. The 75 ms timing of W reported here in the
absence of an M judgement is later than the 200 ms mean W
time and close to the 85 ms mean M reported by Libet et al.
(1983). This might be interpreted as evidence that subjects in
these studies misunderstood the request for a W judgement
and gave M judgements instead. Study 3 investigated whether
the relation between hypnotisability and W would hold when M
as well as W judgments are taken.
Method
Participants
Twenty-nine meditation-naı¨ve undergraduate students were
recruited from the University of Sussex. One participant was
excluded prior to analysis due to equipment malfunction.
Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex eth-
ical committee and informed consent was obtained from each
participant before commencing with the study.
Materials and methods
Participants were screened for hypnotisability using the same
procedure as in Study 2.
Visual stimuli were displayed at 100 Hz on a 21” CRT moni-
tor. At the beginning of each trial, a clock face was presented.
This was marked at 30 intervals and subtended a visual angle
of 5. A static dot, subtending at 0.2 appeared at a pseudo-rand-
omised position for each trial and began rotating around the
clock face 250 ms after the clock appeared, performing a full ro-
tation every 2560 ms. Participants were seated at a viewing dis-
tance of approximately 60 cm. A computer mouse was used to
record actions (button presses).
Participants were asked to press the mouse button at a time
of their choosing and to report either the time of the action (M)
or the time of their immediate intention or urge to move (W). In
both trial types, participants were instructed to allow the dot to
complete at least one full revolution before pressing the mouse
button. If this instruction was not followed, a warning message
was displayed and the trial restarted. Similarly, a warning mes-
sage was displayed and the trial restarted if the button had not
been pressed within six full rotations of the clock.
Participants were asked not to preplan their actions. After
the button had been pressed, the clock continued moving for a
pseudo-randomised period of time between 1200 ms and
2370 ms to prevent any influence from the sudden disappear-
ance of the dot. There then followed a pseudo-randomised time
interval (500–1280 ms) during which the clock was not visible on
the screen. Timing judgements were then recorded by moving a
dot around the clock face and pressing the mouse button.
Each block consisted of 40 repetitions of one trial type and
blocks were separated by 30-s rest periods. The two blocks were
presented in counterbalanced order. All Stimuli were pro-
grammed by Jim Parkinson (University of Sussex) and generated
with Matlab (MATLAB 2012b, The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA,
USA) running Psychtoolbox v3 (Kleiner et al., 2007).
Participants also completed a short form of the five facet
mindfulness scale questionnaire (Bohlmeijer et al., 2011), as in
Study 2. Two participants failed to complete the questionnaire.
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These participants were included in all analyses except correl-
ations with the FFMQ-SF.
Participants were recruited for the duration of one term,
until there were no more responses. Bayesian analyses were
used to assess sensitivity.
Analysis
Mean judgement errors on the Libet clock task were calculated
for each participant as in Study 1, but for M (timing of move-
ment) as well as W judgements.
Mean ratings of objective and subjective scores for hypnotis-
ability and scores on the FFMQ-SF were also taken. A combined
hypnotisability score was calculated as in Study 2. Results for
the individual hypnotisability ratings are presented in the
Supplementary Materials. The distance between M and W was
also calculated for each participant (M/W distance).
Results
M judgements (M¼17.1 ms, SD¼ 40.1) correlated with W judge-
ments (M¼143.7 ms, SD¼ 159.0), Spearman’s q (28)¼ 0.526,
P¼ 0.004, BH(0, 0.50)¼ 44.61. Objective (M¼ 1.6, SD¼ 1.2) and sub-
jective (M¼ 1.7, SD¼ 1.0) hypnosis ratings were correlated,
Spearman’s q (28)¼ 0.690, P< 0.001, BH(0, 0.30)¼ 1307.98. The com-
bined hypnotisability rating (M¼ 1.6, SD¼ 1.0), and the derived
measure of the distance between M and W were correlated,
Spearman’s q (28)¼0.376, P¼ 0.049, BH(0, 0.30)¼ 4.90. The com-
bined hypnotisability measure correlated with W, Spearman’s
q(28)¼ 0.350, P¼ .068, BH(0, 0.30)¼ 3.85. There was no evidence as
to whether or not M judgements correlated with the combined
hypnotisability measure, Spearman’s q(28)¼ 0.161, P¼ 0.414, BH(0,
0.30)¼ 1.06.
The evidence was not sensitive as to whether or not FFMQ-
SF scores correlated with W, Spearman’s q (26)¼0.136,
P> 0.250, BH(0, 0.50)¼ 0.67, or with the combined hypnotisability
score, Spearman’s q (26)¼0.147, P> 0.250, BH(0, 0.30)¼ 0.98.
Table 1 shows the results of a fixed-effects meta-analysis
conducted on the results of Studies 2 and 3 to test the overall
evidence for correlations. This revealed support for correlations
between hypnotisability and W judgement and hypnotisability
and mindfulness. The Bayes factor on FFMQ-SF score versus W
was insensitive, so no conclusion follows.
Study 3 discussion
Consistent with predictions, there was evidence that the dis-
tance between M and W judgements was inversely related to
hypnotisability. This counts against the suggestion that highly
hypnotisable people may have confused W with M judgements.
The evidence for a relationship between trait mindfulness and
hypnotisability was inconclusive in this study, but a meta-
analysis of Studies 2 and 3 provides support for this relation-
ship. Strong support is also provided for a relationship between
hypnotisability and judgement of time of intention across the
studies. We were unable to provide any evidence one way or the
other for the relation between trait mindfulness and W judg-
ments. Thus, the question of whether meditation practice per
se as a training in metacognitive awareness of intentions, rather
than trait mindfulness, is crucial to early W judgments remains
open.
General Discussion
We used the Libet task to investigate group differences in the
timing of the conscious awareness of an action intention (W) in
hypnotisable groups and mindfulness meditators. A linear ef-
fect of hypnotisability was found on W (cf. Kirsch, 2011), with
highly hypnotisable participants reporting a later W time than
less hypnotisable participants. Conversely, mindfulness medi-
tators reported an earlier W time than non-meditators. These
differences are supported by a positive correlation between
hypnotisability and W timing in two further studies and a nega-
tive correlation between hypnotisability and trait mindfulness
in a meta-analysis of the results of Studies 2 and 3. The results
are consistent with the prediction from cold control theory that
hypnotisability is inversely related to the coupling of higher
order thoughts to first-order intentions; that is, most generally,
with theories of hypnosis that argue that hypnotic responding
involves changes in the monitoring of intentions, rather than
changes in executive control. Furthermore, the earlier W timing
reported by experienced meditators supports predictions from
Buddhist scholars (Dreyfus, 2013) that mindfulness meditation
enhances metacognition related to action intentions.
Notably, we have recently found that there is no difference
in M judgements between hypnotisable groups and no
difference in M between meditators and non-meditators. A
fixed-effects meta-analysis was conducted on M judgement dif-
ferences in meditators reported in Lush et al. (submitted for
publication) and in Semmens-Wheeler (2012). Mean differ-
ence¼ 6.6 ms, P¼ 0.806 [46.4, 59.7], BH(0, 0.80)¼ 0.27. This B sup-
ports there being no difference between meditators and
non-meditators in M judgements. However, we report here that
W judgements do differ between these groups. As we found evi-
dence for no differences in interquartile range, these results are
unlikely to be attributable to differences in attention to the task.
Table 1. Meta-analytically combined Fisher z-transformed Pearson and Spearman’s correlations between measures of hypnotisability, mind-
fulness, and timing of intention (W) in Studies 2 and 3
Measure
Overall hypnotisability Subjective hypnotisability Objective hypnotisability Mindfulness (FFMQ-SF)
W judgement 0.347 (0.129) 0.369 (0.129) 0.270 (0.129) 0.19 (0.131)
P¼ 0.009 P¼ 0.005 P¼ .041 P¼ 0.152
[0.094, 0.600] [0.117, 0.622] [0.018, 0.523] [0.067, 0.447]
BH(0, .30)¼ 16.63* BH(0, 0.30)¼ 24.85* BH(0, 0.30)¼ 4.88* BH(0, .30)¼ 1.76
Mindfulness (FFMQ-SF) 0.306 (0.131) –0.373 (0.131) 0.203 (0.131)
P¼ 0.023 P¼ 0.006 P¼ 0.126
[0.049, 0.564] [0.115, 0.630] [0.055, 0.460]
BH(0, 0.30)¼ 7.79* BH(0, 0.30)¼ 23.98* BH(0, 0.30)¼ 2.03
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses after means. 95% CI and Bayes factors are reported below means. *¼ sensitive B (evidence for the hypothesis).
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Jo et al. (2015) reported no significant difference in W judge-
ments between meditators and non-meditators, but with
means showing large effects in the same direction as we found
here. A fixed-effect meta-analysis of the standard Libet instruc-
tion comparison reported in Jo et al. and Study 1 revealed strong
evidence in favor of an earlier W time in meditators rather than
non-meditators (M¼ 76 ms, SD¼ 24.2), BH(0, 115)¼ 46.25.
Historically, there has been little agreement as to what the
Libet task is measuring (e.g., Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992;
Maoz et al., 2014), and these results may inform that debate.
One possible interpretation is that the findings may reflect dif-
ferences in a threshold or criterion level of the brain activity
underlying voluntary movement at which people can become
conscious of an intention to move (cf. Schurger et al., 2012). On
this reading, highly hypnotisable people may have a higher
threshold (perhaps resulting from coarser grained concepts of
first-order intentional states) and thus take longer to become
aware of intending. Conversely, mindfulness practice may
lower this threshold (perhaps due to the development of finer
grained concepts of mental state properties). Alternatively, it
has been argued that consciousness is graded and that the tim-
ing of awareness of action intentions may instead reflect a
threshold of reportability (Miller and Schwarz, 2014; though
contrast Dehaene et al. 2014, for the argument that conscious-
ness is relatively all-or-none). These findings are consistent
with either interpretation. From a higher order theory perspec-
tive (e.g., Rosenthal, 2005), whatever pressure brings about pos-
session of concepts of mental states, would not need make such
higher order states more fine-grained in content than the grad-
ations of first-order states themselves. Thus, higher order states
will likely make discrete distinctions between first-order states
(for evidence concerning the extent to which confidence ratings,
i.e. higher order thoughts, reflect discrete states, see Swagman
et al., 2015). Thus, awareness of first-order states (specifically in-
tentions) may be discrete to a degree that varies across individ-
uals (e.g., between high and low hypnotisable individuals) and
that can be made more fine grained by practice (e.g., mindful-
ness meditation). Notably, Schlegel et al. (2015) report motor cor-
tex activity associated with intentional action for highs
performing actions experienced as involuntary following a
post-hypnotic suggestion, consistent with there being no
change in first-order processes in hypnotic responding.
The related question of how one becomes aware of an inten-
tion has been the focus of a large body of research in recent
years (e.g., Haggard and Eitam, 2015), with competing accounts
proposing retrospective (e.g., Wegner, 2002) or predictive (e.g.,
Blakemore et al., 2002) cues. Current theoretical models propose
that the sense of agency is supported by both predictive and
retrospective mechanisms (Synofzik et al., 2008), with the rela-
tive weighting of each depending up their reliability (so that sig-
nals of low noise have a greater influence) (Moore and Fletcher,
2012; Synofzik et al. 2013). However, this question is largely or-
thogonal to the hypotheses addressed here.
Recent findings suggest a second possible mechanism
underlying the earlier W judgement timing reported by mind-
fulness meditators. Mindfulness involves not taking the content
of mental states at face value, and thus potentially not being
drawn to attractive or salient stimuli (e.g., Papies et al., 2015).
Possibly meditators in estimating the time of an intention is
thus not unduly drawn to the time of the action, allowing an
earlier estimate of the time of the intention. However, contra-
dicting this explanation, we have found that meditators com-
pared to non-meditators show more intentional binding, that is,
a process by which the estimated time of one event is drawn to-
ward that of another in an illusory way (Lush et al., submitted).
Group differences in the timing of conscious awareness of
intending a voluntary action may provide a route toward
exploring related cognitive and neuronal processes. For ex-
ample, Moore and Bravin (2015) report that increased variability
of W judgement predicts high schizotypy scores (although there
is evidence for a relationship between schizotypy and hypnotis-
ability (e.g., Connors et al., 2014), we found no difference in W
variability between hypnotisable groups). Delays in the timing
of W have also been reported in groups with parietal lobe dam-
age (Sirigu et al., 2003), and exploration of the neural processes
and architecture supporting the differences reported here may
provide further insight into disorders related to the awareness
of intention, such as schizophrenia (for a review of disorders of
volition, see Kranick and Hallett, 2013). Intriguingly, later W
timing has also been found in conversion disorder patients
(Edwards et al., 2012), suggesting the possibility that cold control
theory may provide a way of investigating the often hypoth-
esised link between functional or psychogenic disorders and
hypnosis (see Vuilleumier, 2014).
It has been argued that in order to become tractable to em-
pirical investigation, consciousness may need to be theoretic-
ally divided into constituent structural properties (Seth, 2009).
Phenomena that involve changes in subjective visual percep-
tion such as binocular rivalry has been employed to study neu-
ral correlates of visual consciousness (e.g., see Maier et al., 2012).
Similarly, the identification of hypnotic responding as changes
in the subjective experience of intending may provide a fruitful
avenue to investigate the biological substrates of conscious ex-
periences of volition. More generally, the sense of agency is a
rapidly growing field of study within psychology (see Moore and
Obhi, 2012; Chambon et al., 2014; David et al., 2015; Haggard and
Eitam, 2015), and the investigation of changes in the sense of
agency resulting from hypnosis has the potential to illuminate
and inform findings in this area.
In summary, this study reveals individual differences in the
timing of a metacognition of action initiation related to mind-
fulness meditation and hypnotisability. These findings are con-
sistent with the cold control theory of hypnosis and with the
proposal that hypnotisability and mindfulness meditation lie at
opposite ends of a scale of metacognition related to the con-
scious awareness of intention (Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes,
2012).
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